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Abstract 
Retail food price inflation in the UK peaked at nearly 14% in the summer of 2008, a level much 
higher than had been seen in the previous 10 years and, since then, food price inflation has 
continued to lead general inflation. An obvious factor driving domestic retail food prices is world 
commodity prices, but other factors matter too. In this paper, we model UK food price inflation 
and explore a range of potential drivers including world food prices, exchange rates, 
manufacturing costs, oil prices and wages. Over the period 1990-2010, we show that the major 
drivers of UK food price inflation are world raw food prices and the exchange rate; less 
important are manufacturing costs, unemployment and earnings. Oil prices matter too but 
indirectly via their effect on world agricultural commodity prices. We also show that the effect 
on domestic retail food price inflation depends on the duration of the shocks arising on world 
commodity markets. 
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1. Introduction 
In the past few years, policy makers and commentators have paid considerable attention to retail 
food price inflation which has tended to exceed general inflation across many countries. In the 
UK, retail food price inflation reached around 14 per cent in mid-2008 which compares to non-
food price inflation of 2 per cent for the same period. More recently (July 2011), data from the 
Office for National Statistics shows that while general inflation was recorded at 4.2 per cent, 
retail food price inflation was reported at 6.9 per cent. This increase in domestic retail food price 
inflation came against the background of the ‘spike’ in world agricultural commodity prices that 
had seen increases of almost 80 per cent between early 2006 and mid-2008 before dropping back 
sharply in 2009. By early 2011, world agricultural commodity prices had again increased with 
the recorded price levels exceeding the ‘spike’ of 2007-2008, with this expected to re-fuel 
domestic retail food price inflation. While the link between world agricultural commodity prices 
and domestic food prices seems obvious, it is important to note that raw commodities are not the 
same as the commodities bought at the retail level, the latter involving a wider range of inputs 
and marketing services that are embodied in retail food prices; recent data from the Department 
of Food, Environment and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) suggests that the share of raw agricultural 
prices in total value added of retail food prices is approximately 30 per cent. This suggests that 
factors in addition to world commodity prices will have an impact on domestic retail food prices, 
and that it is the size of their price changes and their weighting in food inflation that matter. 
A further consideration in determining the impact of world commodity prices on retail food price 
inflation (or indeed any other factor) is the duration of the ‘spike’. Commodity prices are 
typically characterised by long-periods of relatively low and stable prices interrupted by ‘short’ 
price spikes (Deaton and Laroque (1992) and Williams and Wright (1991)). Given that a ‘spike’ 
can vary in duration and allowing for lags in the transmission of changes occurring in world 
markets to feed through to the retail sector, the effect of shocks in world prices will depend on 
the persistence of the shock. For example, close examination of the commodity price ‘spike’ in 
the late 2000s indicates that world prices started their upswing in spring 2006 and reached their 
peak in spring 2008 before falling back sharply in 2009. For any given lag structure, the effect on 
monthly inflation will involve the accumulated effect of previous price shocks, the magnitude of 
this effect being contingent on the dynamics of the specific commodity price ‘spike’. Given 
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world commodity prices typically display relatively short but not necessarily single-period 
shocks before returning to lower levels (Deaton and Laroque (op. cit.)), the net effect of 
commodity price shocks will be lower than those implied by the estimated long-run elasticities. 
The focus of recent papers in the area of food pricing has been on explaining the 2008 
commodity price spike (see, for example, Sumner (2009), Trostle (2008), HMG (2009), Wright 
(2011) and Baffes and Haniotis (2010)). The emphasis is given to price movements at the world 
level rather than on domestic consumer food prices and thus on the raw rather than the processed 
commodity. The current paper extends the literature by examining not only the pattern of retail 
food price changes in the UK but also exploring the link between world raw food prices and 
domestic retail prices, As far as we are aware, there has been no research to date that has directly 
addressed the issue of food price inflation in the UK. 
 
In this paper, we employ a 6 variable cointegrated vector autoregressive (C-VAR) model to 
explain retail food price inflation in the UK between 1990 and 2010. The econometric 
framework is attractive for this purpose: not only does it capture important inter-relationships 
and dynamics in the system but readily facilitates simulation through impulse response analysis. 
We account for two possible dimensions between events on world markets and UK retail food 
prices. The first relates to the price transmission effect i.e. raw commodity price changes through 
to changes in retail food prices. The second relates to the world oil price; while oil prices can 
have an impact directly on domestic food prices as a cost variable in the production and 
distribution of food at the retail level, they can also have an indirect effect via the link between 
oil prices and world agricultural prices. This indirect effect reflects the closer linkages between 
world oil and agricultural prices resulting from the growth in global ethanol production, 
particularly due to US biofuel mandates, which has been seen as one of the main determinants of 
world agricultural prices in recent years (Baffes and Haniotis (2010) and Wright (2011)). Hertel 
and Beckman (2011) provide a recent discussion of the links between energy and commodity 
markets that have recently emerged. 
Given recent events on world commodity markets coupled with the high levels of food price 
inflation in the UK, the specific contribution of this paper is to explore the determinants of retail 
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food price inflation accounting for a range of factors that may drive it. The results show that the 
factors that primarily determine UK retail food price inflation are world agricultural prices and 
the sterling exchange rate, with other manufacturing cost variables, such as labour costs, and 
demand factors being less important. In a mature market economy like the UK, it is perhaps 
unsurprising that these results suggest supply side factors dominate demand side factors given 
aggregate income and price elasticities of demand are quite low. Oil prices matter too, but this 
effect is primarily indirect via the impact of oil prices on world agricultural prices, the latter 
change being subsequently passed through on to domestic retail prices. We also show that the 
effect of world agricultural prices on retail food price inflation depends on the duration of the 
spike; a 10% increase in world agricultural prices lasting for one month will increase retail food 
inflation by 0.28% while the same shock lasting for 18 months will increase food price inflation 
by 2.42% differences that the more usual ceteris paribus measures of ‘long run’ elasticity cannot 
capture. 
The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we provide background on UK retail food price 
inflation over the 1988-2010 period and comment briefly on developments on world commodity 
markets that relate to the domestic food price effects. In this context, we also discuss the range of 
likely determinants of retail food prices. In Section 3, we outline the econometric methodology 
and report the key insights from the estimated model. In Section 4, we use impulse response 
functions to highlight the role of the underlying determinants of UK food price inflation and 
report results relating to the duration of shocks that would impact on the rate of food price 
inflation. In Section 5, we summarise and conclude. 
2. UK Consumer Food Price Inflation 
Over the last 20 years, UK food price inflation has tended to be more volatile than overall 
inflation and non-food inflation as shown in Figure 1 below. Indeed, there are periods where 
food inflation is negative, something not observed in the other series. Equally, there are 
significant peaks in food price inflation in July 1995 and mid-2001 as well as the outlier spike in 
prices in 2008-9. The evidence would suggest that food price inflation behaves differently to 
non-food price inflation and, given Food and Non-Alcoholic Beverages make up just over 10% 
of the total Consumer Price Index, understanding the drivers of food price inflation becomes an 
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important part of unpicking the causes of general inflation not least because the effects of food 
price inflation are felt differently by consumers across different income levels.  
 
Considerable attention has been paid to developments on world commodity markets, the rise in 
retail food price inflation in 2007 and 2008 as shown in Figure 1 being correlated with the 
commodity price spike1. There are two aspects to this link: the horizontal dimension which 
relates world commodity prices to producer level prices (i.e. farm-gate prices) and the vertical 
dimension which relates raw commodities prices to retail food prices. These horizontal and 
vertical dimensions are shown in Figure 2. The data show that the changes in world commodity 
prices are more substantive than retail food prices, though there is an apparently closer link 
between world agricultural prices and domestic producer (i.e. farm-gate) prices; while the data 
indicate a relatively close correlation between domestic producer prices and world commodity 
prices, the correlation appears weaker between retail food prices and developments in world 
markets2. This does not imply that there is no link but the data show clearly that volatility in 
world agricultural prices does not correspond closely to the volatility observed in domestic retail 
food prices. Furthermore, even when world prices started to fall back from their peak in late 
2008, domestic retail food prices were still rising which suggests lagged adjustment to 
developments on world agricultural prices over previous months.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
1 We do not aim to document the causes of the commodity price spike that has been discussed extensively elsewhere 
see, for example, Sumner (2009) or  HMG (2009).  
2 It is also worth noting that the experience of retail food prices in face of the commodity price spike was 
considerably different across members of the EU where the link between world food prices and domestic prices 
appears to be much weaker (Ferrucci et al., 2010). See also Bukeviciute et al. (2009) who document the experience 
of food price transmission across EU member states following the 2007/2008 commodity price spike.  
 
5 
Figure 1: Annual Inflation for All Goods, Food and Non-food CPI 1989(1)-2010(1) (%) 
 
 
Source: (ONS) 
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Figure 2: Indices of World Food Prices and UK Retail and Domestic Producer Prices 
(2005=100) 
 
Source: IMF, ONS and DEFRA  
These two aspects to the transmission process have received some coverage in the literature. The 
first is ‘horizontal’ price transmission that relates to world prices to the corresponding domestic 
producer prices for the ‘same’ commodity. Examples of empirical research relating to horizontal 
price transmission include Ardeni (1989), Barrett (2001) and FAO (2003) and a priori there can 
be many reasons why we would not expect complete horizontal price transmission. At the 
sectoral level, horizontal transmission will be determined by trade or domestic agricultural price 
support policies that may break the link between what happens on world markets to domestic 
markets for the same commodity. From a macroeconomic perspective, the change in the 
exchange rate vis-à-vis the US dollar may result in a lower or higher price increase in commodity 
prices when translated into domestic currency terms (given that most internationally traded 
commodities are priced in US dollars). Clearly, movements in the sterling:dollar exchange rate 
may offset or exacerbate the effect of dollar denominated prices of agricultural commodities on 
world markets. Figure 3 provides an indication of how the US dollar/sterling exchange rate has 
moved over time. Note that, in early 2008, sterling fell against the dollar implying that, even if 
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world commodity prices had remained unchanged, the UK import price for commodities 
procured on world markets would have increased. 
Vertical price transmission relates to changes in the raw commodity through to the 
corresponding retail price will depend on a broader range of factors that reflects the 
characteristics of the food processing and retail sectors. As noted above, raw agricultural 
commodities tend to account for a relatively small proportion of total value-added of the food 
product sold at the retail level. Other manufacturing costs will therefore be important in 
determining retail food prices. Perhaps most obviously is factor intensity of food manufacturing 
which tends to be relatively labour intensive. The extent of competition in the food processing 
and retailing sectors can also determine commodity pass-through. Recent studies that have 
focussed on commodity cost pass-through include Lloyd et al. (2006), Vavra and Goodwin 
(2005) and Nakamura and Zerom (2010) among others. Focussing more directly on the 
commodity price changes and food inflation across a wide range of countries, IMF (2008) noted 
that international to domestic price transmission was less than domestic price transmission into 
general inflation. In emerging economies, about one half of domestic price shocks are reflected 
in core inflation, while for advanced economies, the corresponding estimate is less than one 
quarter (IMF, 2008). Ferruci et al. (2010) focus on food price pass-through in the Euro area and 
showed that world commodity prices are a poor approximation for the cost pressures faced by 
Euro-area food producers since the Common Agricultural Policy breaks the link between what 
happens on world markets with what happens domestically.  
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Figure 3: US$:£ Exchange Rate 1988(1) – 2010(12) 
 
Source: IMF Financial Statistics 
It is clear that there is an inter-relationship between the prices of the world’s major traded 
commodities and key to explaining this is the price of oil. Its role in explaining the pattern of 
food price inflation is however perhaps more complex than with other commodities and  issues 
arise with respect to dealing with the price of oil on food price inflation. On the one hand, there 
is a potential direct link given that oil is both an input into production and a cost of transportation 
too. However, the impact of oil as a determinant of inflation may be relatively weak. Recent 
studies show (Blanchard and Gali (2007) for the US, Shioji and Uchino (2009) for Japan, De 
Gregorio et al. (2007) for a selection of OECD countries) that the links between oil and the 
macro-economy are now considerably weaker since the 1970s and that this is true for a large 
number of countries, a feature arising from reduced reliance on oil as opposed to other forms of 
energy.  
On the other hand, there is a potentially important indirect link between oil prices and retail food 
price inflation which relates to the linkages between energy markets and world commodity prices 
via biofuels. In recent years, the rise in the world price of oil, coupled with the biofuel mandates 
pursued by the US resulted in large amounts of land being diverted to crops that could be 
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converted into energy, the diversion in land use contributing to the spike in world agricultural 
prices. Around 2000, about 5 per cent of US cropland allocated to maize went to renewable 
energy; by 2010, this share was just under 40 per cent. Globally, between 2000 and 2007, ethanol 
production tripled. Since the viability of ethanol production depends on oil prices (as well as 
policy initiatives such as the US government mandates), there is the possibility of a closer link 
between oil prices and world agricultural prices,  The relationship between world oil prices and 
world food prices is shown in Figure 4. The data suggest a limited relationship between oil prices 
and world commodity prices prior to 2000; after 2000, and reflecting the increase in ethanol 
production, there is stronger evidence of a relationship between oil and commodity prices. 
Although taken over the full sample period, there does not appear to be a close link between 
energy prices and raw agricultural commodity prices (which is confirmed in the econometric 
model), we nevertheless allow for the possibility of a structural break following 1999 reflecting 
the increase in land devoted to ethanol production. In summary, even if oil prices do not have a 
strong direct effect on retail food price inflation via increasing manufacturing or transportation 
costs, they may nevertheless still matter in that, by impacting on land use, world agricultural 
prices rise which, in turn, impacts on retail food prices via the vertical price transmission effect3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
3 Hertel and Beckman (2010), and Wright (2011) summarise the issues relating to biofuels and world commodity 
markets. See also Esmaeili and Shokoohi (2011). 
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Figure 4: World Oil and Agricultural Prices, 1990-2010 
 
Source: IMF Financial Statistics 
Finally, we need to consider demand side factors that could influence food price inflation. 
Demand shifters are often proxied by measures of income, other prices or tastes. For a 
number of reasons including limited data frequency for our purposes, we have to employ a 
proxy variable to try and capture demand effects and to that end we use the unemployment 
rate.  The use of the unemployment rate is not ideal but the choice of macro-economic variables 
as a proxy for demand was limited by the monthly frequency of the data.  
3. Empirical Methods 
The non-stationary behaviour that characterises the food price index and its drivers discussed in 
the previous section gives rise to the possibility of cointegrated long-run relationships. While the 
vertical price transmission relationship between raw commodity and retail food prices is the most 
likely candidate, we do not rule out the possibility of other horizontal relationships among 
commodity prices.4 To allow for the potential existence of these long run linkages coupled with 
                                                        
4  Using conventional (ADF) test procedures we find the food price index and the drivers identified in section 3 are 
integrated of order one, [i.e. I(1)] confirming the view of casual inspection.  
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the potentially dynamic nature of the adjustment process, we develop an econometric model in a 
co-integrated vector autoregressive (C-VAR) framework. This has an underlying form given by, 
                                    ttptpttt
εΨΦΦΦ +++++= −−− Dxxxx  . . . 2211  (1) 
where lag length (p) is determined empirically using conventional model selection criteria and
tx
 
is a vector of jointly determined I(1) variables containing the UK retail food price index ( tr ) and 
a set of potential drivers, as discussed in Section 2. Specifically, these are the natural logs of: the 
domestic producer and world commodity prices ( td  and tw  respectively) the latter being priced 
in US dollars; the dollar price of oil ( to ) ; the $:£ exchange rate ( te ); the supply shifter, which 
we proxy with UK labour costs ( tl ) reflecting the labour intensity of food processing and 
retailing; and the rate of unemployment ( tu ) which we use as a demand proxy.
5 Deterministic 
terms (constants, trends, seasonals and dummies) are contained in the vector 
tD
 and tε  is a 
vector of disturbances, assumed to be serially independent with zero mean and finite covariance 
matrix, Σ . 
 
While (1) captures the dynamic correlations between the variables succinctly, the VAR is 
difficult to interpret economically. Where the variables form cointegrated relationships, then (1) 
is more conveniently expressed in its vector error correction (VEC) form,  
                                    ∑
−
=
−− ++∆+=∆
1
1
1'
p
i
ttititt εΨDxΓxαβx  (2) 
where the cointegrated relationships are explicitly parameterised by the matrix β , coefficients of 
which provide estimates of the usual (long-run) response elasticities, given that the variables are 
expressed in natural logs. Trace and Maximal Eigenvalue statistics are used to assess the number 
of cointegrating relationships among the data. Equation (2) also defines a matrix of error 
correction coefficients α , elements of which load deviations from equilibrium (i.e. 1−txβ'  ) into 
tx∆  for correction, thereby quantifying the speed at which each variable adjusts to maintain 
equilibrium. Coefficients in iΓ  estimate the short-run effect of shocks to the variables on 
tx∆ and thereby allow the short and long-run responses to differ.  Given our interest in the 
                                                        
5 Data definitions and sources are provided in the Appendix. 
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dynamics of food prices as well as the long-run impact of changes in the drivers in tx , we use 
impulse response analysis to provide dynamic simulations of the effects of shocks of known size 
and duration in each driver on UK food prices. While based on the parameters estimated in (2), 
impulse response functions take into account the knock-on and feed-back effects that may exist 
between the variables and, in doing so, provide contrast to the long-run elasticities of β  which, 
being ceteris paribus in nature, explicitly ignore such interactions. Plots of the impulse response 
function over time provide a graphical illustration of the period-by-period simulation, describing 
both the adjustment path and long-run effect on the food price index in response to the shock.   
 
Given the monthly frequency of our data, the VEC representation expresses the variables as 
month-on-month growth rates. Owing to the isomorphism (Hendry, 1995, p.287) between (1) 
and (2), the VEC model may be equivalently expressed in log-levels (as in (1)) by algebraic 
manipulation. This is useful when we wish to evaluate the dynamic impact of shocks on the level 
of food prices. However, since this holds for any linear transformation of (2), we also re-arrange 
the VEC model in terms of the annualised rates of growth (the proportional changes over 12 
months) given that the annualised rate of food inflation is a commonly used metric of price 
changes.  
 
4. Results 
Our empirical VEC model contains seven equations (in tttttt loewpr ∆∆∆∆∆∆ ,,,,,  and tu∆ ) 
which we estimate using the least generalised variance estimator available in Time Series 
Modelling 4.31 (Davidson, 2010) with 245 monthly observations spanning the sample period 
1990-8 to 2010-12.6  Owing to the trends that are apparent in the data, we allow for the 
possibility of drift in the VEC specification. Results (see Table 1) for the model with six lags 
point to the presence of two cointegrating relationships and drift at conventional levels of 
significance.7 Examination of the estimated matrix of cointegrating coefficients β  suggests that 
                                                        
6 The least generalised variance estimator is equivalent to Gaussian maximum likelihood. All data and summary 
output is available upon request.  
7 Diagnostic checks for autocorrelation, heteroscedasticty, ARCH and functional form support model adequacy at 
conventional levels of significance, although evidence of non-normality in some equations suggests that additional 
caution is warranted in conducting inference. Subsequent testing for the most obvious causes of non-linearity price 
behaviour could not identify the precise cause and nature of the non-normality. 
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the two co-integrating relationships correspond to a (vertical) price transmission relationship and 
a second (horizontal) relationship between the international market prices of oil and food 
commodities.  
 
Table 1: Cointegration Test Statistics [p values] 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 Eigenvalues in the reduced rank regression, with drift, lag length 6: 
  0.174 0.156 0.113 0.078    0.028 0.018 0.002   
   
 Johansen tests of H0: rank = r  Trend test given rank = r. 
 r   Maximal Eigenvalue  Trace                χ2(n-r) 
 0      46.88  [<0.05]      149.61 [<0.01]      57.28    [0.000]    
 1      41.44  [<0.05]      102.73  [<0.025]     20.14 [0.003]    
 2      29.27  [<0.2]       61.28  [<0.2]       16.93 [0.005]    
 3      19.97  [<0.5]       32.01  [<0.2]       14.04 [0.007]    
 4      7.04 [<1]       12.05 [<1]       14.04 [0.003]    
 5      4.63  [<1]       5.01 [<1]       5.65 [0.059]    
 6     0.38 [<1]      0.38 [<1]       3.32 [0.069]    
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
While the results indicate two stable cointegrating relations, we wish to allow for the closer ties 
between oil and food commodities in the post-US biofuel mandate era (as discussed in Section 2) 
and so let the second cointegrating relation change at this time. The results of this modified 
specification are summarised in Table 2. They show that the elasticities are signed in accordance 
with intuition, inelastic in magnitude and statistically significant at or around conventional 
levels. The first of the two cointegrating relationships, the price transmission relation, links the 
domestic food price index with world food commodity prices, augmented by the $:£ exchange 
rate and the supply and demand shifters (the rate of unemployment and labour costs 
respectively).8 In this relationship, the elasticity of retail food prices with respect to world food 
commodity prices - the long run price transmission elasticity – is the largest and suggests that, 
other drivers held fixed, a 10% increase in agricultural prices on the world market is associated 
with a 6.34% increase in retail food prices in the long run. Price transmission between 
commodity and retail markets is thus not one-for-one, reflecting among other factors, the more 
stable influence of non-agricultural components in retail food prices.  The results also point to 
                                                        
8 The index of domestic producer prices was found to contribute little to the long run relation (over and above that 
exerted by international commodity prices) and is thus excluded from it, although it remains in the model owing to 
its important influence on the food price index in the short run. 
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the important role played by exchange rates in domestic food prices: a 10% appreciation 
(depreciation) in the value of Sterling against the dollar being associated with a long-run 5.10% 
fall (rise) in retail food prices, ceteris paribus. The supply and demand shifters that augment the 
price transmission relationship have somewhat smaller effects on food prices, and suggest that 
10% increases in demand (unemployment) and supply (labour costs) shifters lead to ceteris 
paribus long-run effects on food prices of -1.59% and 2.33% respectively.  
 
Table 2: Long Run Elasticities 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 Elasticity of food prices with respect to:  
 World food commodity prices 6.34 
  [0.001] 
 Exchange rate -5.10 
  [0.002] 
 Labour costs 2.33 
  [0.06] 
 Unemployment rate -1.59 
  [0.15] 
  
 Elasticity of world food commodity prices with respect to:  
 Oil prices pre-1999(3) 5.53 
  [0.000] 
 Oil Prices post-1999(3) 6.51 
  [0.011] 
 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
The second cointegrating relation represents the links between the price of oil and food 
commodities on international markets. Estimates suggest that in the biofuels era a 10% increase 
in oil prices has been associated with a 6.51% ceteris paribus increase in world agricultural 
commodity prices. The somewhat smaller increase (5.53%) prior to that date suggests that 
commodity prices have indeed become more sensitive to energy prices in recent years.9 While 
relationships between international commodity prices are not our principal focus, incorporating 
                                                        
9  Experimentation suggest that the precise date of the structural change around this time has little effect on 
the estimates and their statistical significance. The 1999-3 breakpoint to chosen on the basis of model 
selection criteria, principally the SBC. 
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them in a second cointegrating relation does mean we are able to quantify the impact of oil prices 
on domestic food inflation. We address this issue using impulse response analysis in the 
following section and merely note here that chain linking the long-run elasticities implies that a 
10% change in oil prices leads to a (6.51×0.634=) 4.1% increase in food prices. As with the other 
drivers, the response of food prices to oil price shocks is inelastic and, according to the estimates 
in Table 2, not dissimilar in magnitude to the impact of changes in the exchange rate.  
 
4.1  The Duration of Shocks and Response Dynamics 
To obtain a more complete picture of the dynamic effects of changes to the drivers we undertake 
an impulse response analysis and trace the effect of shocks of a specific size and duration on UK 
food prices.  Figure 5 illustrates the dynamic effect of a 10% one-period shock or ‘blip’ in each 
driver on the food price index in the 18 months after the shock (the effects being expressed as a 
percentage of predicted food price level in the absence of the shock). Each impulse response 
function measures a separate experiment (i.e. a 10% shock to each driver) so they are plotted 
together merely for convenience.  As can be seen, shocks to world food commodity prices and 
exchange rates have the largest quantitative impact on food prices with the maximum impact 
occurring in the month following the shock. Specifically, a one-period 10% increase in world 
food commodity prices is estimated to increase food prices by almost 0.3% in the month 
immediately following the shock, an impact that diminishes to 0.06% a year after the shock. The 
effect of exchange rate shocks is quantitatively similar albeit opposite in sign; a one-month 10% 
appreciation in Sterling depresses food prices by an estimated 0.22% in the month following the 
shock and by 0.1% one year later.  One-period shocks to labour costs and unemployment 
produce similar patterns but with quantitatively smaller impacts. Interestingly, the pattern of food 
prices in response to oil price shocks is quite different to those following shocks to the other 
drivers. Oil price shocks appear to have negligible effects on food prices in the short run, 
building momentum only slowly over time, ‘peaking’ some two and half years following the 
shock (not shown). This slow-burn effect is in stark contrast to the dynamics of other shocks 
whose effects tend to dissipate over time. While little should be read into the precise timing of 
the peak, the fact that the effect unwinds over such a long time scale might reflect more of a 
biofuels explanation (in which oil prices affect cropping patterns) than a costs-based story of oil 
price shocks.  
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Figure 5: The Percentage Change in Food Prices Following One Period 10% Shocks 
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Subject to the usual caveats regarding non-marginal changes, the effect of larger shocks can be 
inferred from the graph simply by multiplying by the appropriate scalar. For example, a 50% 
increase in world food commodities prices for one-month shifts the impulse response function by 
a factor of five, increasing food prices by nearly (5×0.28=) 1.5% in the month following the 
shock and by 0.3% a year later. While not inconsequential, the effect of such a large shock seems 
small. Furthermore, similarly modest effects result following shocks to the exchange rate, and 
even more so for the other drivers. However, the puzzle is more apparent than real since these 
seemingly modest effects merely reflect the short-lived (one-period) duration of the shocks. To 
illustrate we repeat the experiments, this time simulating the effect of a permanent 10% increase 
in each of the drivers on the food price level (Figure 6).  In each simulation, the shock shifts the 
driver to a new level that is permanently 10% higher, with the result that effects last for longer 
and are considerably larger in magnitude. For example, a permanent 10% shock in world 
commodity prices leads to an initial 0.3% increase (replicating the result of a temporary shock) 
which then continues to grow, peaking at around 2.0% some 18 months later. Hence, the effect 
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of a 10% commodity price shock differs by a factor of (2.0/0.3=) seven depending on its 
duration. Similarly amplified effects are predicted when permanent shocks to the other drivers 
are simulated.  
 
Figure 6: The Percentage Change in Food Prices Following Permanent 10% Shocks 
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Of course, the one-period and permanent simulations portrayed in Figures 5 and 6 are polar 
cases, with permanent shocks representing something of a worst-case scenario. To gauge the 
impact of some more empirically relevant intermediate cases, consider Table 3 which offers a 
summary along with the long-run elasticities for comparison. As expected, the effects on food 
prices grow as the duration of the shock lengthens. Shocks of 9 months are more akin to a 
permanent change than one-off shocks, suggesting that a typical commodity price spike (the 
2008 spike lasted around 15 months) is likely to induce a response towards the top end of the 
magnitudes estimated. Sizeable though these are, they are lower than the long-run elasticity, the 
more commonly used metric. The extent to which estimates of the permanent shock differ from 
the corresponding long-run elasticity depends on the importance and nature of the interactions 
among the variables in the system (which are incorporated in the impulse response analysis and 
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ignored by the elasticities). Results suggest that these interactions tend dampen the effect of the 
shocks on food prices, particularly so for world commodity price shocks, where the predicted 
maximum impact on food prices (2.05%) is less than one-third implied by the (ceteris paribus) 
long run elasticity (6.34%).  As a result, a (say) 50% increase in world food commodity prices is 
predicted to raise food prices to a peak that is (5×2.72=) 14% above their un-shocked level, 
considerably less than the (5×6.33=) 32% implied by the long-run elasticities. Comparisons for 
the other drivers show less of a contrast, suggesting that the net effect of interactions within the 
system are les important. As noted above, food prices tend to behave differently to oil price 
shocks, a feature that is also borne out in Table 3 where the interactions have a tendency to 
compound the ceteris paribus response rather than weaken it, a feature that may well reflect 
more structural ramifications of shifts in the price of oil.   
 
Table 3: Peak Impacts on UK Food CPI of 10% Shocks by Duration 
 
 Duration of the Shock (months) 
 1 3 6 9 12 18 Permanent 
Long-run 
Elasticity 
Commodity Prices 0.27 0.77 1.15 1.64 1.88 2.05 2.05 6.34 
Exchange rate -0.22 -0.63 -1.11 -1.49 -1.81 -2.33 -3.81 -5.10 
Oil Prices 0.06 0.18 0.36 0.53 0.71 1.06 5.10 4.10 
Labour Costs 0.10 0.29 0.51 0.69 0.84 1.09 1.70 2.33 
Unemployment Rate -0.04 -0.14 -0.35 -0.47 -0.57 -0.73 -1.15 -1.59 
 
What is also apparent from Figures 5 and 6 is that the dynamic response of food prices (as well 
as the long run impact) is determined by the duration of the shock. To give a more complete 
picture of these dynamics, Figure 7 presents the predicted effect on food prices in response to a 
10% shock in world food commodity prices of various durations, with D=1 and D=∞ 
representing the impulse response functions of one-period and permanent shocks to world food 
commodity prices in Figures 5 and 6. Clearly, the size and persistence of the effect on food 
prices increases with duration of the shock; the impact developing during the period in which the 
shock persists and declines thereafter as the shock becomes more distant. This dictates that the 
maximum effect on food prices does not occur at some fixed lag length, say five months after the 
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shock, but varies with the duration of the shock; short-lived shocks creating peaks in food prices 
that are more immediate than with long-lasting shocks.  
 
Figure 7: Percentage Effect on UK Food CPI of a 10% Shock to World Food Commodity 
Prices by Duration of the Shock 
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4.2 The Effect of Shocks on Food Price Inflation 
As discussed in Section 3, food price inflation is typically measured in terms of its annualised 
rate, and so it seems useful to cast the results of the impulse response analysis in these terms. As 
before, the response of (annualised) food inflation to shocks is determined by both the magnitude 
and duration of the shock. Figure 8 displays the dynamic impacts of permanent 10% shocks to 
each driver, paralleling the effects portrayed in Figure 6. Each impulse response function plots 
the predicted difference in the rate of food inflation between the ‘with’ and ‘without’ shock 
scenarios, and since it is the effect on the annualised rate of inflation that is measured on the 
vertical axis, the units of measurement are percentage points. Notice that results for the first 12 
months are similar to those shown in Figure 6, but thereafter differ as the effect of the shock 
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becomes embodied in the base price level from which the annualised rates of inflation are 
calculated.10 While the simulations assume permanent (i.e. worst case) shocks of 10%, it is easy 
to see how persistent shocks of large magnitude might induce double-digit food inflation, a topic 
we briefly turn to now.   
 
Figure 8: The Change in Food Price Inflation Following Permanent 10% Shocks  
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A key application of the annualised inflation representation of the model is forecasting. While 
valuable for policy evaluation in real time, we do not present such forecasts here. We can 
however use the model to infer the sort of shock required to induce a specific level of food price 
inflation. Of particular interest is the most recent burst in UK food inflation which peaked in the 
summer of 2008 at nearly 14%, having been at historically low levels for many years. Since the 
commodity price spike was the principal culprit, we shall frame the analysis in terms of 
commodity prices, acknowledging that the on-off nature of the shocks we simulate only 
approximate the more complex dynamics of the commodity price shocks observed in practice.  
                                                        
10. Hence the estimated responses in the months after this point - and thus the peaks observed at 12 months itself - 
are determined by the arithmetic of the annualised inflation calculations rather than the dynamics of the underlying 
model. 
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Table 4 summarises the magnitude of the shock to the world food commodity price index 
required to reproduce a 2008-type spike in UK food inflation.11 According to the model 
estimates, the commodity price index would need to rise 476% if the shock were to last just one 
month, compared to 70% if the shock lasted an entire year. Intermediate durations of 3, 6 and 9 
months suggest shocks of 169%, 100% and 79%, considerably larger than the 22% implied by 
the long run elasticity which, as explained above, ignores the interactions between the variables 
in the model.  Large though the shocks are, the magnitudes for the more long-lived of them are 
empirically plausible; the actual shock to world food prices in 2008/9 being around 60% in 
magnitude.  
 
Table 4: Magnitude of Commodity Price Shocks (%) required to reproduce the 2008/9 
Spike in food inflation by duration of the shock 
 Duration of the Shock (months) 
 1 3 6 9 12 
Long-run  
Elasticity 
Commodity Prices 476 169 100 79 70 22 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
Retail food price inflation in the UK over recent years has exceeded non-food price inflation 
reaching a peak of round 14 per cent in 2008. More generally, food price inflation has been more 
volatile than non-food price inflation. The obvious inference to draw  is that retail food price 
inflation is driven by world commodity prices, the high levels of retail food price inflation 
reflecting the spike in world commodity prices in 2007-2008. However, world commodity prices 
are not the only factor that might drive retail food prices. Using a 6 variable vector 
autoregressive model, we have shown that there are a range of factors that determine retail food 
prices. Even though world commodity prices play a dominant role, the exchange rate, 
manufacturing labour costs and oil prices also matter. The latter is of interest insofar as the 
impact on retail food price inflation is indirect, reflecting the growing link between world energy 
and agricultural markets in recent years, in large part a consequence of the bio-fuel mandates 
                                                        
11  For the purposes of this exercise, the simulations are based on the annualised rate of food inflation of 14%. 
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pursued by the US government. In addition, given the underlying characteristics of commodity 
price behaviour on world markets (i.e. relatively low prices punctuated by spikes), the impact of 
world commodity prices on retail food price inflation will depend on the duration of the shock. 
Given the expectation that world commodity prices are likely to be higher and more volatile in 
the future, understanding the dynamics of commodity price (and other) shocks on domestic retail 
prices is an important issue for macroeconomic policy. 
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 Appendix 
 
Definition Source 
UK Consumer Price Index (all items). Office for National Statistics (ONS) 
UK Consumer Food Price Index. OECD, OECD Statistics. http://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx 
UK Retail Price Index (all items). Office for National Statistics (ONS) 
World Food Price Index  
IMF Primary Commodity Prices: 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/res/commod/index.asp 
$:£ Exchange rate IMF Financial Statistics 
Agricultural Producer price index (UKAPPI). UK DEFRA 
Manufacturing Input costs index. Office for National Statistics (ONS) 
Average Earnings index for the whole economy s.a. Office for National Statistics (ONS) 
Oil Price ; UK Brent, light blend 38 API, fob U.K. 
IMF Primary Commodity Prices: 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/res/commod/index.asp 
Unemployed: UK (Thousands) s.a. Office for National Statistics (ONS) 
 
